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The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: 
The Regulation of Pharmacy Benefit Managers by 
a Market Adversary 
Joanna Shepherd1 
ABSTRACT 
Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) save Americans billions of dollars each year by 
lowering both the prices that consumers pay for prescription drugs and the prices that 
health plans pay for drug coverage.  As I explain in this Article, however, new regulatory 
developments in some states threaten to undercut competition in the PBM industry and 
disrupt the cost-savings PBMs currently generate.  The regulatory scheme that was 
adopted by Mississippi in 2011, and that is currently under legislative consideration in 
several other states, shifts regulatory control of PBMs from the neutral Insurance 
Commissions to the states’ Boards of Pharmacy.  The fundamental problem with this 
structure is that the Boards of Pharmacy are made up of pharmacists, the direct market 
adversaries of PBMs.  In several different areas of the prescription drug market, PBMs 
and pharmacists are in direct competition over profits.  Thus, the pharmacist-controlled 
Boards of Pharmacy have both the incentive and the opportunity to exert their regulatory 
authority in ways that benefit pharmacies at the expense of PBMs; reductions in PBMs’ 
profits generally lead to more profits for pharmacists. Indeed, I describe two important 
regulatory changes that the Board has enacted in its first two years that harm PBMs and 
benefit pharmacies.  The power to regulate a market adversary gives pharmacists 
unprecedented power and will undercut competition in the prescription drug market.  I 
explain how this regulatory scheme will not only hurt the PBM industry, but will also 
increase the prices that consumers and third parties pay for prescription drugs. 
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Although most people have never heard of a “pharmacy benefit manager,” 95% of 
insured Americans have prescription drug coverage that is administered by one.2  
Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) act as the middlemen among pharmacies, drug 
manufacturers, insurers, and consumers with prescription drug coverage.  They influence 
how much consumers pay for drugs, which pharmacies they use, and even which drugs 
they take.  By negotiating discounts with pharmacies and manufacturers, substituting less 
expensive drug alternatives when appropriate, and filling prescriptions for chronic 
conditions by mail, PBMs save consumers and third parties that pay for prescription 
drugs billions of dollars each year.3   
However, recent regulatory developments in some states threaten to disrupt the PBM 
industry and the cost savings they currently produce for consumers of prescription drugs.  
The regulatory scheme currently in place in Mississippi—and under legislative 
consideration in several other states—gives regulatory control over PBMs to the states’ 
Boards of Pharmacy.  Although this regulatory scheme is innocuous on its face, 
pharmacists—who serve on the Boards of Pharmacy—are market adversaries of PBMs.  
In several different areas of the prescription drug market, PBMs and pharmacists are in 
direct competition over profits.  Thus, the pharmacist-controlled Boards of Pharmacy 
have both the incentive and the opportunity to exert their regulatory authority in ways 
that benefit pharmacies at the expense of PBMs.  Indeed, although the Mississippi Board 
of Pharmacy has only had regulatory authority over PBMs for a little over a year, 
examples of regulations that harm PBMs have already emerged.  Unfortunately, this 
regulatory scheme will do more than just hurt the PBM industry, it will also increase the 
prices that consumers and third parties pay for prescription drugs. 
PBMs administer the prescription drug benefits for health plan sponsors such as 
employers, labor unions, and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).  PBMs engage 
in various activities to manage their clients’ prescription drug benefit efficacy and costs.  
For example, PBMs negotiate discounts on prescription drug prices from pharmacies in 
exchange for the pharmacy’s placement on the preferred network for plan participants.  
PBMs also negotiate discounts and payments from drug manufacturers in exchange for 
the manufacturers’ drugs placement on the preferred list of medication for various 
ailments.  In addition, PBMs interact electronically with pharmacists that are filling 
prescriptions to substitute generic drug substitutes or lower-priced alternatives when 
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appropriate.  These practices that are central to the PBM business model produce lower 
prices for prescription drugs.  Indeed, research shows that consumers with PBM-
administered prescription drug coverage pay between 15% and 50% less for drugs than 
do non-insured customers buying the exact same drugs. 4 
Yet, despite evidence of the significant cost savings that PBMs generate for 
consumers and health plan sponsors, critics of the PBM industry have successfully 
lobbied state legislatures for increased regulation of these companies in recent years.  
These regulations include a variety of rules related to licensing, investigations, duties to 
clients, disclosures of financial terms with manufacturers, and the extent to which savings 
must be passed on to consumers.  Until 2011, despite the various regulatory schemes,  all 
states gave regulatory authority over PBMs to a neutral insurance commission. In 2011, 
Mississippi became the first and only state to shift regulatory authority over PBMs from 
the Insurance Commission to the Board of Pharmacy. The Board of Pharmacy is 
composed entirely of pharmacists.5  Legislatures in Oregon, Hawaii, and Oklahoma are 
currently considering proposals to allow the state Boards of Pharmacy to regulate PBMs. 
In the last legislative session, Washington, New Hampshire, Alabama, and Louisiana 
considered similar proposals. 
The fundamental problem with this regulatory scheme is that PBMs are the direct 
market adversaries of pharmacies in several segments of the prescription drug market.  
For example, when PBMs negotiate price discounts for prescription drugs at network 
pharmacies, they put direct pressure on the profits of both network and non-network 
pharmacies.  In addition, when PBMs attract customers to mail-order pharmacies with 
lower drug costs, they reduce the number of prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies.  
Granting Boards of Pharmacy regulatory control over PBMs creates an inherent conflict 
of interest by giving pharmacists regulatory control over their natural competitors in the 
marketplace.  Under this new regulatory scheme, a Board has both the incentive and the 
power to exercise its regulatory power in ways that weaken PBMs’ competitive positions, 
and in turn, benefit pharmacies.  The power to regulate a market adversary gives 
pharmacists unprecedented power and will severely undercut competition in the 
prescription drug market.  Moreover, this regulatory scheme will increase the prices of 
prescription drugs for both consumers and health plan sponsors. 
Even though the Mississippi Board of Pharmacy has only had regulatory authority 
over PBMs for a little over a year, two regulations have already emerged that harm PBMs 
and benefit pharmacies.  First, the Mississippi Board of Pharmacy has the power both to 
require PBMs to turn over sensitive financial information and to share that information 
with pharmacies. This practice will benefit pharmacies by giving them business 
information about their market adversaries and it will weaken the PBM industry and 
produce significant harms for consumers and health plan sponsors.   
Second, on January 23, 2013, the Mississippi Board of Pharmacy enacted a rule 
imposing a fiduciary duty on PBMs.  PBMs’ new fiduciary status will compel them to 
adopt certain defensive measures, curb various cost-saving practices, incur additional 
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(2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf.  
5 Press Release, Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, Mississippi State Board of Pharmacy 
Backs Down After PCMA Threatens Lawsuit (2013), available at http://www.pcmanet.org/2013-press-
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legal and administrative costs, and increase the reporting of sensitive business 
information.  As a result of these changes, the cost of prescription drug coverage 
administered by PBMs will increase.  Moreover, many of the consequences of a fiduciary 
duty will undermine PBMs’ competitive positions in the prescription drug market relative 
to retail pharmacies that do not have fiduciary status.  Thus, the newest regulation further 
demonstrates that the Board is utilizing its regulatory authority to disadvantage PBMs 
while benefitting pharmacies. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  In Section I, I describe the role of PBMs in 
administering prescription drug coverage and the structure of the PBM industry.  I also 
discuss empirical evidence that shows that PBMs produce significant benefits to 
consumers and health plan sponsors by lowering both the prices of prescription drugs and 
the cost of prescription drug coverage.  In Section II, I discuss the specific arguments that 
critics make in their demands for more regulation of the PBM industry and the empirical 
evidence showing that more regulation is unnecessary.  I also briefly describe the history 
of federal and state regulatory efforts toward the PBM industry.  In Section III, I discuss 
the existing regulatory scheme in Mississippi and the current proposals in Oregon, 
Hawaii, and Oklahoma to grant Boards of Pharmacy regulatory authority over PBMs.  
Then, I present an economic analysis of these approaches and explain why granting 
regulatory authority to a market adversary will undercut competition in the prescription 
drug market.  As a result of these approaches, both consumers and health plan sponsors 
will pay more for prescription drugs and prescription drug coverage. 
I. BACKGROUND ON PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS 
Many private sector entities that offer medical insurance also offer prescription drug 
coverage to their members. These health plan sponsors may include employers, labor 
unions, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), and other entities.  Health plan 
sponsors often hire PBMs to manage prescription drug benefits for their members. 
Ninety-five percent of Americans with prescription drug coverage receive their benefits 
through a PBM.6 
In this section, I describe the role of PBMs in administering prescription drug 
coverage and the structure of the PBM industry.  I also discuss empirical evidence that 
shows that PBMs produce significant benefits to consumers and health plan sponsors by 
lowering both the prices of prescription drugs to plan participants and the overall cost of 
prescription drug coverage to the health plan. 
A. The Role of Pharmacy Benefit Managers 
PBMs engage in various activities to manage prescription drug benefits for client 
health plans. First, PBMs assemble networks of retail pharmacies where plan participants 
can easily fill prescriptions by simply providing a copayment (copay).7 When a consumer 
presents a prescription to the pharmacist at a retail pharmacy, the pharmacist inquires 
whether the consumer has prescription drug benefit coverage.  If there is coverage, the 
pharmacies’ computer systems ensure that the prescription is filled according to the 
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consumers’ specific coverage plan.  The consumer pays the retail pharmacy the 
copayment that is due according to the plan.  PBMs negotiate specifics of this plan. More 
specifically and most importantly, PBMs negotiate the price for prescription drugs at the 
retail pharmacy.  The prescription drugs are then paid for by a combination of consumer 
payments (copays, deductibles, or co-insurance) and health plan sponsors’ payments to 
the pharmacy.8 By harnessing the buying clout of the many consumers covered by client 
sponsors’ prescription drug plans, the PBMs can negotiate discount prescription drug 
prices for both health plans and consumers.9   
Second, PBMs work with health plan sponsors to create the list of preferred drugs for 
different medical conditions (the formulary) for which the plan will provide coverage.  
The health plan offers participants incentives, such as lower copayments, to use the 
formulary drugs.10 As a result, drugs listed on the formulary face considerable consumer 
demand, and in turn, produce significant sales for drug manufacturers.  Manufacturers 
negotiate with PBMs to obtain formulary status for their drugs. The primary bargaining 
tools that manufacturers wield in these negotiations are price discounts and rebates that 
drug manufacturers pay to PBMs to have their drugs listed on the formulary.  Drug 
manufacturers compete intensively with each other for formulary status, and thus the 
rebates or discounts can often be substantial.11  The PBMs then use these rebates to lower 
prices for the formulary drugs.  As a result of this negotiation between PBMs and drug 
manufacturers, both consumers and health plans pay lower prices for prescription drugs.12   
Third, many PBMs employ mail-order pharmacies to keep prescription drug costs 
low.  Many prescription drug plans encourage covered consumers to fill prescriptions for 
ongoing, chronic conditions through mail-order pharmacies.  These pharmacies can offer 
discounts because of the efficiencies they achieve by high-volume dispensing and the 
dispensing of longer, 90-day prescriptions.  In addition, when PBMs own a mail-order 
pharmacy, they can ensure that customers receive formulary drugs, generic substitutes, or 
cheaper alternatives when appropriate in order to keep prescription drug prices low.  
Indeed, empirical research has shown that mail-order pharmacies offer prescription drugs 
at significantly lower prices than their retail counterparts.13 
Fourth, PBMs process and pay prescription drug claims for their health plan sponsor 
clients. That is, they ensure that when a consumer with prescription drug coverage fills a 
prescription at a pharmacy, the pharmacy and drug manufacturers receive the correct 
payments or reimbursements.  PBMs can offer significant savings through the economies 
of scale they achieve in claims processing. As of 2011, the top three PBMs each manage 
about 20% of the almost four billion prescriptions dispensed in the U.S. every year, 
requiring large, sophisticated infrastructures.14  
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10 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 6.   
11 Id. at 6-7. 
12 Id. at iv-v.   
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Finally, PBMs may perform various other services to efficiently manage the 
pharmacy benefits of consumers.  For example, as pharmacists fill prescriptions, PBMs’ 
computer systems check for drug interactions among a consumer’s current prescriptions, 
determine whether a generic version of a prescribed drug is available, calculate whether 
enough days have passed before a prescription can be refilled, analyze physician 
prescribing patterns, and provide treatment information and monitoring of covered 
individuals with certain chronic diseases.15   
B. Structure of the Pharmacy Benefit Management Industry 
Approximately sixty PBMs operate in the United States today.16  Industry experts 
estimate that 95% of patients with prescription drug insurance coverage receive their 
benefits through a PBM.17  This translates into more than 215 million Americans with 
prescription drug coverage administered by PBMs.18 
 Although the relative size or market share of PBMs vary according to the specific 
measure used—i.e. prescriptions per year or individuals covered—the market is generally 
considered to have at least ten significant competitors.19  The three largest PBMs—
Medco Health Solutions, Express Scripts, and CVS Caremark—account for roughly 20% 
of the almost four billion prescriptions dispensed in the U.S. every year.20  Express 
Scripts and Medco have recently merged, increasing market concentration among the 
largest PBMs. However, several PBMs owned by insurers and retailers, as well as smaller 
stand-alone PBMs, have become viable competitors to larger PBMs that have 
traditionally had a stronger market presence.21 Indeed, these smaller PBMs are 
increasingly winning employer accounts away from Medco, Express Scripts, and CVS 
Caremark.22  The intense competition in this market has forced PBMs to lower the prices 
of their services in order to remain competitive, resulting in declining PBM profit 
margins in recent years.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 1-2. 
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lists forty eight PBMs in its online directory.  However, the directory may be under-inclusive as a fee is 
required for inclusion. See PBM Directory, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, 
http://www.pbmi.com/pbmdir.asp (last visited Jul. 9, 2013); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 
1-2. 
17 Letter to Senator Richard L. Brown, supra note 2, at 4. 
18 See VISANTE, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS (PBMS): GENERATING SAVINGS FOR PLAN SPONSORS AND 
CONSUMERS 3 (2011). 
19 This market is defined as the market for full-service PBM services to health plan sponsors; it does not 
include any PBM services provided to health plans, as they do not typically offer the same capabilities and 
services as the PBM services to health plan sponsors.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CONCERNING THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION OF MEDCO HEALTH SOLUTIONS 
BY EXPRESS SCRIPTS, INC. (2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/120402expressmedcostatement.pdf. 
20 Gryta, supra note 9. 
21 FED TRADE COMM’N, supra note 19, at 3. For example, Costco unveiled its own PBM in early 2013; with 
almost 450 Costco pharmacies and annual prescription drug revenues of approximately $1.6 billion, it 
promises to be a significant competitor in the PBM industry. Costco Unveils Its Own PBM, DRUG 
CHANNELS (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.drugchannels.net/2013/01/costco-unveils-its-own-pbm.html. 
22 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 19, at 3-5. 
23 Id. at 2. 




C. Benefits of Pharmacy Benefit Management 
PBMs produce significant benefits for consumers and health plan sponsors by 
lowering both the price of prescription drugs to plan participants and the overall plan 
costs of prescription drug coverage.  Moreover, PBMs improve health outcomes by 
making prescription drugs more affordable, thus allowing more Americans to take their 
medications as prescribed. 
Consumers with prescription drug coverage administered by PBMs pay significantly 
lower prices for prescription medication.  PBMs negotiate significant rebates from drug 
manufacturers by offering their drugs exclusive formulary status in exchange for rebates.  
PBMs also harness the buying clout of their many enrolled consumers to negotiate 
discounts at retail pharmacies.  Consumers benefit from these negotiated rebates and 
discounts by paying lower prices for prescription drugs.   
Several studies have measured the rebates PBMs are able to negotiate with drug 
manufacturers.24  Based on an annual survey of health plans, the average rebate that 
PBMs negotiated from drug manufacturers in 2012 was $16.70 per prescription for each 
brand name drug dispensed at a retail pharmacy.25  That is, PBMs were able to negotiate 
a payment of $16.70 each time a prescription for a brand name drug was dispensed to one 
of their covered consumers.  Similarly, the average rebate that PBMs negotiated for each 
prescription of a generic drug dispensed at a retail pharmacy was $6.13.   
Other studies have examined the discounts PBMs negotiate with retail pharmacies.26  
A study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) that explored pharmacy benefits 
for federal employees found that PBMs were able to negotiate significant discounts on 
both brand name and generic prescriptions.27  PBMs were able to negotiate prices on 
brand name drugs that were, on average, 18% less than the prices that non-covered 
consumers paid for the same drug at the same retail pharmacies.28  Negotiated discounts 
on generic drugs were even greater; PBMs negotiated prices that were, on average, 47% 
less than the prices non-covered consumers paid for the same generic drugs at retail 
pharmacies.29   
Most contracts between PBMs and plan sponsors require that PBMs share with the 
plan sponsor a very large fraction of the discounts they negotiate with manufacturers and 
pharmacies.30  As a result, the rebates and cost savings negotiated by PBMs have led to 
significantly lower health plan costs and lower drug prices for consumers. 31 The FTC has 
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http://benefitdesignreport.com. 
25 PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, supra note 24, at 29.  
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27 GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 9. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 57-58. 
31 Although there has been some dispute about the extent to which PBMs pass on the cost savings they 
negotiate from drug manufacturers to plan sponsors and consumers, research indicates that a significant 
portion of the savings are shared.  A decade-old study by the FTC reported that even when there was less 
competition in the PBM industry, PBMs passed on over 50% of the cost savings to health plan sponsors. 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 57-60. However, as competition for sponsor contracts has 
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found that, compared to customers without prescription-drug insurance, customers with 
PBM-administered prescription drug coverage paid 15% less for brand name drugs that 
did not have generic alternatives.32  Similarly, customers with PBM-administered drug 
coverage paid 25% less for brand name drugs that did have generic alternatives.33  The 
difference in prices was greatest for generic drugs: insured customers paid 50% less for 
generic drugs than did non-insured customers buying the exact same drugs. 34   
In addition to lowering the prices that consumers pay for prescription drugs, PBMs 
have employed several other tools to reduce both prescription drug spending and overall 
health care spending.   Many PBMs have reduced drug spending by increasing the use of 
generic drugs.  Generic drugs are bioequivalent to brand name drugs; they contain the 
same active ingredients as brand name drugs, and are chemically identical in strength, 
concentration, dosage form, and route of administration.35  However, generic drugs are 
substantially less expensive:  the average total prices for generic drugs are approximately 
25% of the prices of brand name drugs that have no generic alternative.36  By substituting 
generic drugs for brand name drugs when appropriate, PBMs have lowered prescription 
drug spending for covered consumers.37 
PBMs’ use of mail-order pharmacies also significantly reduces prescription drug 
spending.  Mail-order pharmacies produce various cost saving, including the realization 
of economies of scale by dispensing larger prescription sizes (i.e. 90-day instead of 30-
day), dispensing more formulary drugs that produce manufacturer rebates, and increasing 
substitutions from brand name to generic drugs.38  These cost savings have translated into 
significant savings for consumers.  The average price that consumers and health plans 
paid for brand name generic drugs dispensed from mail-order pharmacies was 27% less 
than the price that consumers without prescription drug coverage paid at retail 
pharmacies for the exact same drugs. 39  For generic drugs, mail-order pharmacies 
dispensed drugs that cost 53% less than what consumers without prescription drug 
coverage paid at retail pharmacies.40 
 PBMs also reduce prescription drug spending with various other cost-saving 
approaches.  Some PBMs employ therapeutic interchange programs to substitute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
competitive.  For example, the 2010 financial statements from one major PBM indicate that the company 
passed on 87.5% of the drug manufacturer discounts to customers.  MEDCO HEALTH SOLUTIONS, ANNUAL 
REPORT  (FORM 10-K) 55 (2010). In 2010, Medco Health Solutions reported receiving $5.8 billion in 
rebates from brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers. Only 12.5% of total rebates were retained by 
Medco, while 87.5% were passed back to Medco’s clients. Id. Similarly, Express Scripts stated in its 2010 
Form 10-K, “Over the last several years, competition in the marketplace has also caused many PBMs, 
including us, to reduce the prices charged to clients for core services and share a larger portion of the 
formulary fees and related revenues received from pharmaceutical manufacturers with clients.” EXPRESS 
SCRIPTS, ANNUAL REPORT  (FORM 10-K) 19 (2010). 
32 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 36. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 61.    
36 On average, generic drugs cost less than half the price of brand name drugs that do have generic 
alternatives. Id. at 28. 
37 Id. 
38 See, e.g., id. at 23-40.  
39 GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 9. 
40 Id. 




clinically appropriate and less costly drugs with physician approval.41  Others use a prior 
authorization process that requires the PBM to approve the dispensing of certain drugs 
before the health plan sponsor will pay for it.42  Similarly, step therapy plans require 
patients to try less expensive drugs before the plan sponsor will pay for more expensive 
drugs.43  Most PBMs employ various other utilization controls, such as limits on frequent 
refills, to control costs.44 
PBMs’ cost-cutting tools produce significant savings for consumers. Estimates of 
the magnitude of PBMs’ cost-savings range from 30%45 to 35%46 of total prescription 
drug spending.  More affordable prescription drugs may mean that more Americans 
will be able to afford to take their medication as prescribed. Higher priced prescription 
drugs result in more people skipping doses or not filling prescriptions at all.47  Thus, by 
saving consumers money, PBMs are also improving health outcomes and, in many 
cases, they may be saving lives. 
II. REGULATION OF PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS 
Despite the substantial cost savings outlined in the previous section, PBMs also face 
substantial criticism. In this section, I discuss the specific arguments that critics make in 
their demands for more regulation of the PBM industry and the evidence showing that 
more regulation is unnecessary.  I also briefly describe the history of federal and state 
regulatory efforts toward the PBM industry. 
A. The Need for Regulation  
Critics of the PBM industry argue that the PBM business model creates fundamental 
conflicts of interest.  They argue that these conflicts of interest arise as a result of the 
incentives created both by PBMs’ contracts with drug manufacturers and retail 
pharmacies and by PBMs’ ownership of mail-order pharmacies.  As a result, critics argue 
that more regulation of the PBM industry is needed to protect the interests of consumers 
and plan sponsors. 
Critics allege that the rebates drug manufacturers pay to PBMs to have their drugs 
listed on the formulary create incentives for PBMs to heavily favor certain drugs over 
others.48  This could be detrimental to consumers and plan sponsors if the favored drugs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 10-14. 
42 See, e.g., id. 
43 See, e.g., id. 
44 See, e.g., id. 
45 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3, at Table 6 at 28. The “Average Value of Drug Benefit” is the 
estimate of PBM savings. 
46 VISANTE, supra note 18, at 5. 
47 William Sage et al., Why Competition Law Matters to Health Care Quality, 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 31, 35 
(2003). (“when costs are high, people who cannot afford something find substitutes or do without. The 
higher the cost of health insurance, the more people are uninsured.  The higher the cost of pharmaceuticals, 
the more people skip doses or do not fill their prescriptions”).  
48 Letter from Senator Mark Montigny, Legislative Association on Prescription Drug Prices, to Chairman 
Deborah Platt Majoras, Fed. Trade Comm’n (May 11, 2005) (“Our own experience as state legislators 
dealing with state agencies which must negotiate with PBMs has shown that PBMs often act contrary to the 




either cost more or provide inferior therapeutic benefits as compared with other 
alternatives. 
Similarly, critics claim that PBMs’ confidential contracts with retail pharmacies 
create potential conflicts of interest.  For example, they argue that PBMs can unfairly 
increase the spread—the difference between the prices plan sponsors pay for a drug and 
the amount the PBM reimburses the retail pharmacy—to increase PBM profits.49  This 
could harm pharmacies, plan sponsors, and consumers by generating overpayments from 
plans and reduced payments to retail pharmacies. 
However, the largest controversy involves PBMs’ ownership of mail-order 
pharmacies.  Critics assert that by both administering the pharmacy benefits for plan 
sponsors and dispensing drugs via their mail-order pharmacy, PBMs have the opportunity 
to create various “self-dealing” arrangements to increase their profits.50  For example, 
PBMs could encourage plans to adopt certain payment structures that steer consumers to 
purchasing more drugs from the PBM-owned mail-order pharmacy.51 In addition, critics 
allege that PBMs can persuade their mail-order pharmacies to dispense more brand name 
drugs or expensive drugs that yield higher rebates from drug manufacturers.52  Finally, 
PBM opponents allege that PBM-owned mail-order pharmacies increase their profits by 
repackaging drugs and selling them at a higher price.53  All of these practices could be 
harmful if PBMs’ increased profits came at the expense of consumers.   
In response to these allegations, several government entities—The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO)—have analyzed the PBM industry to determine whether any of 
these alleged conflicts of interest produce undesirable consequences for consumers and 
plan sponsors.54  The studies all conclude that PBMs benefit consumers and health plan 
sponsors by significantly reducing the prices that consumers pay for prescription drugs.55   
In response to the specific allegations by critics, both the FTC and GAO found that 
PBMs pass on a significant portion of the payments they receive from drug 
manufacturers.56  In fact, the GAO concluded that PBMs’ sharing of manufacturer 
payments reduce total annual drug spending by as much as 9%.57  Similarly, the GAO 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
interests of the buyers they represent. . . . PBMs often direct individuals to drugs that provide the PBM with 
the highest rebates, and the greatest margins, while failing to pass those savings on to purchasers.”). 
49 See, e.g., Robert I. Garis & Bartholemew E. Clark, The Spread: Pilot Study of an Undocumented Source 
of Pharmacy Benefit Manager Revenue?, J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N 15-21 (2004). 
50 JAMES LANGENFELD & ROBERT MANESS, THE COST OF PBM “SELF-DEALING” UNDER A MEDICARE 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT 30-31 (2003), available at http://www.reducedrugprices.org/read.asp?news 
=325. 
51 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at xviii.   
52 See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n Of Chain Drug Stores, NACDS Applauds Bipartisan Bills to Confront PBM 
Tactics and Protect Pharmacy Choice for Patients (2011), available at http://www.nacds.org/Home/TabId/107/ 
PostId/149/nacds-applauds-bipartisan-bills-to-confront-pbm-tactics-and-protect-pharmacy-choice-for-
patients.aspx. 
53 See LANGENFELD & MANESS, supra note 50, at 1, 5-6, 11-13. 
54 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 27-36; GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 10; CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3, at 40. 
55 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 27-36; GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 10; CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3, at 40. 
56 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 57-60. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 11-12. 
57 GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 11-12. 




found that PBMs achieved significant discounts for drugs purchased at retail pharmacies; 
customers with PBM-administered drug coverage paid 18% to 47% less than non-
covered consumers paid for the same drug at the same retail pharmacies.58    
In regards to the allegations concerning PBM-owned mail-order pharmacies, the 
FTC found no evidence of self-dealing arrangements.  It found that PBM-owned mail-
order pharmacies generally are no less likely to substitute generic drugs for brand name 
drugs than are either retail pharmacies or mail-order pharmacies not owned by PBMs.59  
Similarly, it concluded that there is no evidence that PBM-owned mail-order pharmacies 
substitute more expensive drugs for therapeutically similar cheaper drugs.60 Finally, the 
FTC found that PBMs rarely dispense repackaged drugs through their owned mail-order 
pharmacies, and, as a result, the financial impact of repackaging is negligible.61  Both 
GAO and FTC found that as a result of PBMs’ cost-saving practices, the prices that 
consumers paid for prescription drugs dispensed from PBM-owned mail-order 
pharmacies are significantly less than the prices of drugs dispensed from retail 
pharmacies.62 
B. History of Regulatory Efforts 
Despite the lack of evidence, suspicion of PBMs has led both state and federal 
governments to pursue various frameworks for regulating the PBM industry.63   
In general, the federal government’s efforts to regulate the PBM industry have been 
much less expansive than the states’ efforts.64  The FTC, the federal agency tasked with 
promoting consumer protection and eliminating anti-competitive business practices, has 
focused its oversight of PBMs on pursuing antitrust issues related to the PBM industry.65  
Beyond that, many FTC officials believe it is unnecessary to regulate the PBM industry 
and are openly opposed to such regulation.66  The Department of Labor, the government 
agency that regulates employee benefit plans, has not sought to regulate the PBM 
industry.67  Indeed, some regulatory scholars believe it would be impossible for 
preexisting regulatory agencies to effectively monitor the nuanced commercial 
interactions that allow PBMs to lower healthcare costs;68 they fear that misguided 
administrative actions by regulators that do not fully understand the complexity of the 
PBM industry and business model could have a negative impact on the integrity of the 
healthcare system.69  Some advocate for the creation of an entirely new federal regulatory 
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59 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 65-70.   
60 See id. at xii.  
61 See id. at xiii.   
62 See id. at 27-36; GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 10.  
63 See Kevin C. Green, Regulation of Pharmacy Benefit Managers: An Economic Analysis of Regulation 
and Litigation as Agents of Health Care Change 9 (January 2008), http://works.bepress.com/kevin_green/ 
1.  
64 See id. 
65 Id. 
66 The FTC has written numerous papers discouraging any additional regulation of the PBM industry.  Id. at 
11. 
67 Id. at 9. 
68 See Mark Meador, Squeezing the Middleman: Ending Underhanded Dealing in the Pharmacy Benefit 
Management Industry Through Regulation, 20 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 77, 109 (2011). 
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agency devoted to monitoring the PBM industry.70 However, the creation of such an 
agency is unlikely given government concerns that the costs of bureaucratic red tape 
would negate the savings that the PBM industry presently provides to consumers.71 
The federal government’s reluctance to regulate PBMs has encouraged the critics of 
PBMs to turn to the states for PBM regulation. 72   Over the past decade, nearly every 
state has considered legislation to regulate PBMs, and seventeen states have enacted 
some regulation.73  The states have chosen different aspects of PBMS to regulate, 
including information disclosure licensing, investigations, duties to clients, and rebate 
sharing.74  The diversity of regulatory structures enacted in different states has caused 
redundant, complex litigation.75 
Still, there are two common themes that unify PBM regulation across most states.76  
First, almost all states require PBMs to register with their state’s insurance 
commissioner.77  Second, states generally require PBMs to submit annual audits.78  
Beyond these common themes, states’ regulatory frameworks contain numerous 
idiosyncratic features distinguishing them from other states.79 
III. REGULATORY AUTHORITY OVER PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS 
Despite the assorted regulatory environments that PBMs face in different states, all 
states that have elected to regulate PBMs have done so through their Insurance 
Commission.  However, in 2011, Mississippi became the first and only state to shift 
regulatory authority over PBMs from the Insurance Commission to the Board of 
Pharmacy.80  Legislatures in Oregon, Hawaii, and Oklahoma are also considering 
proposals to allow the state Boards of Pharmacy to regulate PBMs.  In the last legislative 
session, Washington, New Hampshire, Alabama, and Louisiana considered similar 
proposals.81 
In this section, I discuss existing and proposed regulatory schemes that grant Boards 
of Pharmacy regulatory authority over PBMs.  Then I present an economic analysis of 
these approaches and explain why granting regulatory authority to a market adversary 
threatens competition in the prescription drug market.  As a result of these approaches, 
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71 See Letter from Susan S. DeSanti et al., Director Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade Comm’n, et. al. to  
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both consumers and health plan sponsors will pay more for prescription drugs and 
prescription drug coverage. 
A. Regulation by the Board of Pharmacy 
Prior to 2011, all states placed regulatory authority over PBMs with a neutral 
insurance commission.82  The state insurance commissioners are either political 
appointees or elected officials that have nothing to gain or lose from regulatory decisions 
that affect PBMs.83 Several states, however, have recently taken steps to shift regulatory 
control of PBMs away from insurance commissioners and to the state Boards of 
Pharmacy.84   Unlike the neutral insurance commissions, the Boards of Pharmacy are 
composed of pharmacists that are the direct market adversaries of PBMs.85   
1. Mississippi 
On April 26, 2011, Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour signed Senate Bill 2445 
amending the Mississippi Pharmacy Practice Act.86	    This law shifted regulatory authority 
over PBMs from the Mississippi Insurance Commissioner to the Mississippi Board of 
Pharmacy.  Under the new amendments, PBMs need to clear several regulatory hurdles to 
legally operate in Mississippi.  The law requires PBMs to obtain a license from the Board 
of Pharmacy,87 and to submit annual balance sheets and income statements to the Board 
of Pharmacy.88  Although these requirements do not differ substantially from what was 
required of PBMs prior to enactment of the new amendments,89 the critical difference is 
that PBMs must turn over the necessary information to the Board of Pharmacy instead of 
a neutral insurance commission.  Of greater concern is that the new amendments to the 
Mississippi Pharmacy Practice Act allow the Board to conduct financial examinations of 
PBMs’ businesses,90 and require PBMs to share potentially sensitive business 
information with the Board.91  Although the Act specifies that PBMs will not be required 
to disclose proprietary information, it provides no guidance on what is considered 
proprietary.  Thus, the scope of protection for sensitive financial information is unclear.  
Moreover, the Board of Pharmacy is permitted to share the business information it 






87 “The board shall be responsible for the control and regulation . . . of pharmacy benefit managers . . . .”  
MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-21-83 (West 2013).  The initial licensure fee for pharmacy benefit managers shall 
be set by the board but shall not exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00).  Id.  The licensure period lasts 
from January 1st to December 31st annually.  Id.   
88 MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-21-157 (West 2013).  These financial documents are due “by March 1 or within 
sixty (60) days of the end of [the PBM’s] fiscal year if not a calendar year.”  Id. 
89 Letter from George Dale, Commissioner of Insurance, Mississippi Insurance Department, to All 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers Operating in the State of Mississippi, Bulletin No. 2007-1 (2007), available at: 
http://www.mid.ms.gov/bulletins/20071bull.PDF. 
90 MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-21-159 (West 2013). 
91 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-21-157 (West 2013).  The amendments include the following clause limiting 
the type of information PBMs must disclose the Board of Pharmacy: “However, no pharmacy benefit 
manager shall be required to disclose proprietary information of any kind to the board.”  Id. 




obtains from PBMs with any health plan sponsor, pharmacist, or pharmacy.92  As I 
explain in the next section, allowing the Board to share sensitive business information 
with pharmacies, the market adversaries of PBMs, threatens to undercut competition in 
the PBM industry and increase the cost of both prescription drugs and prescription drug 
coverage.  These amendments to the Mississippi Pharmacy Practice Act include a sunset 
provision repealing these regulatory changes on July 1, 2013.93 
2. Proposals in Other States 
Legislation currently under consideration in Oregon, Hawaii, and Oklahoma would 
alter regulatory structures for monitoring PBMs by shifting power to the States’ Boards 
of Pharmacy.  In the last legislative session, Washington, New Hampshire, Alabama, and 
Louisiana also considered similar proposals.94  The regulatory provisions in the proposed 
legislation are similar to those enacted in Mississippi.   
On January 14, 2013, the Oregon Representative Committee on Health Care 
introduced House Bill 2123, which would require the Oregon Board of Pharmacy to 
regulate PBMs.95  The proposed legislation would require PBMs conducting business in 
Oregon to obtain a license from the Oregon Board of Pharmacy.96  It would alter PBMs’ 
pricing schemes by requiring PBMs “to permit covered individuals to fill mail-order 
prescriptions at a retail community pharmacy [sic] in the same manner and at similar 
price that individuals fill orders at mail-order pharmacies.”97  Thus, this provision would 
eliminate the market advantage that PBMs’ mail-order pharmacies currently have over 
retail pharmacies. 
On January 17, 2013, both Oklahoma and Hawaii introduced legislation altering the 
states’ regulation of PBMs.98 Hawaii’s legislation grants the Board of Pharmacy 
relatively open-ended  regulatory authority over PBMs by allowing the Board “to adopt 
rules . . . to regulate all pharmacy benefit management companies.”99   
In addition to requiring PBMs to “obtain a license from the State Board of 
Pharmacy,”100 Oklahoma’s legislation specifically grants the Board the ability to demand 
proprietary business information from PBMs.  It would allow the Board to demand 
disclosures from PBMs and, as necessary, “subpoena witnesses and information.”101  It 
would also require PBMs to disclose sensitive financial information including “the 
difference in the amount paid to providers for prescription services rendered to covered 
individuals and the amount billed by the pharmacy benefits manager to the covered entity 
or plan sponsor to pay for prescription services rendered to covered individuals.”102  In 
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other words, Oklahoma’s legislation explicitly allows the Board of Pharmacy to demand 
confidential information about the business practices of PBMs. 
 
B. Economic Analysis of Regulation by a Market Adversary 
The amended Mississippi Pharmacy Practice Act creates an inherent conflict of 
interest by giving pharmacists regulatory control over their natural competitors in the 
marketplace.  The power to regulate a market adversary gives pharmacists unprecedented 
power and will undercut competition in the prescription drug market.  Moreover, this 
regulatory scheme will increase the prices of prescription drugs for both consumers and 
health plan sponsors. 
Pharmacists and PBMs are market adversaries in two different areas of the 
prescription drug market.  First, pharmacists and PBMs negotiate prices that plan 
sponsors will pay for prescription drugs at retail pharmacies; the lower the price that 
PBMs can negotiate, the lower the profits for pharmacies.  Second, retail pharmacies 
directly compete with PBM-owned mail-order pharmacies for prescription drug sales; the 
more prescription drugs sold by mail-order pharmacies, the fewer drugs sold by retail 
pharmacies.   
Because PBMs are the direct market adversaries of pharmacies in several segments 
of the prescription drug market, pharmacists have the incentive to take actions that 
benefit themselves at the expense of PBMs.  Reductions of PBMs’ profits generally lead 
to more profits for pharmacists.  By granting the pharmacist-controlled Mississippi Board 
of Pharmacy regulatory authority over PBMs, the amended Act grants pharmacists the 
power to act on these incentives.  That is, under the amended Act, the Board has both the 
incentive and the authority to exercise its regulatory power in ways that weaken PBMs’ 
competitive positions, and in turn, benefit pharmacies.  
Indeed, because PBMs’ mail-order pharmacies are direct competitors to retail 
pharmacies, Mississippi’s PBM regulatory framework is similar to allowing a board 
composed of taxi drivers to regulate a market competitor, private town car companies.  
Imagine the consequences if the taxi board had the authority to set rules governing the 
town car business model or demand confidential business information from town car 
companies.  The taxi board would have both the incentive and the ability to take 
regulatory measures that competitively disadvantaged town car companies while 
benefitting taxi drivers.  The incentives facing the pharmacist-controlled Board of 
Pharmacy are no different than the incentives facing a taxi board. 
There are numerous ways that the Mississippi Board of Pharmacy can exploit this 
regulatory power to establish rules and practices that give pharmacists a competitive 
advantage at the expense of the PBM industry.  The Board of Pharmacy could establish 
various rules or practices that improve pharmacists’ bargaining position as they negotiate 
with PBMs for retail prescription drug prices.  Similarly, the Board could establish rules 
that restrict cost-saving practices that attract consumers to mail-order pharmacies and 
away from retail pharmacies.  In the next sections, I discuss two concrete examples that 
demonstrate how the Mississippi Board of Pharmacy has already established rules and 
practices that competitively disadvantage PBMs while benefiting pharmacists: requiring 




PBMs to turn over sensitive financial information and imposing a fiduciary duty on 
PBMs. 
Unfortunately, the Board’s recently adopted regulations not only reduce the 
profitability of PBMs, they also hurt consumers and sponsors. Future Board practices will 
have the same impact.103  PBMs’ business strategies that reduce profits for pharmacies—
negotiating price discounts at retail pharmacies and implementing cost-saving practices at 
mail-order pharmacies that attract customers away from retail pharmacies—also lower 
the prices that consumers and health plans pay for prescription drugs.  Thus, by 
restricting these business strategies in an effort to improve pharmacists’ profits, the Board 
would increase the prices that health plan sponsors and consumers pay for prescription 
drugs.    
In a letter addressing the likely consequences of allowing the Mississippi Board of 
Pharmacy to regulate PBMs, the Federal Trade Commission opined on the wisdom of 
allowing boards to regulate market adversaries:  
Although we offer no specific recommendations on the ideal structure for 
regulating PBMs, it is our understanding that no other state has placed 
PBMs under the regulatory control of its pharmacy board. Because 
pharmacists and PBMs have a competitive, and at times, adversarial 
relationship, we are concerned that giving the pharmacy board regulatory 
power over PBMs may create tensions and conflicts of interest for the 
pharmacy board. 104 
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission has opposed regulatory boards composed 
of market participants in other industries.  In the Matter of North Carolina Board of 
Dental Examiners,105 the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners “determined 
on its own that teeth whitening was a practice that could be performed only under the 
supervision of a dentist and used the imprimatur of state authority to drive lower-priced 
non-dentists from the relevant market.”106  The board consisted of six licensed dentists, 
one licensed dental hygienist, and one consumer member.107   
In their analysis of the regulatory framework of the North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners, the FTC stated that when a state regulatory body is controlled by participants 
in the very industry it purports to regulate, “common sense and economic theory . . . 
dictate the conclusion that Board actions in this area could be self interested.”108  The 
FTC questioned the board’s ability to regulate the North Carolina dental industry in an 
unbiased fashion given the economic and political pressures influencing the members of 
the board.109  The FTC also noted the lack of supervision of the board’s decision making 
by impartial state actors.   
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The United States Supreme Court has also recognized the danger of regulatory 
boards composed of market participants pursuing their own interests rather than the 
interests of the state.110  In Patrick v. Burget,111 a surgeon in Oregon declined an 
invitation to join a local medical clinic and instead began an independent practice in 
competition with the clinic.112 Subsequently, the surgeon experienced difficulties “in his 
professional dealings with clinic physicians.”113  These difficulties ultimately culminated 
in the local hospital’s peer-review board terminating the surgeon’s privileges to use the 
hospital on the ground that petitioner’s care of his patients was below the standard of the 
hospital.114  The peer-review board consisted of members of the local medical clinic that 
the surgeon had declined to join.115  The surgeon filed suit alleging that the peer-review 
board violated the Sherman Act by initiating proceedings in order to reduce competition 
rather than to improve patient care.  The Court ruled in favor of the surgeon and noted 
that a member of a private regulatory body “may be presumed to be acting primarily on 
his or her own behalf.”116  The Court added that state supervision is necessary to ensure 
regulatory bodies actually further state regulatory policies.117   
The design of Mississippi’s PBM regulatory framework is as troubling as the 
regulatory frameworks discussed in Patrick and North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners, and could raise antitrust issues similar to those in Patrick.118  Mississippi’s 
Board of Pharmacy is controlled by pharmacists that oppose the PBM industry.  As was 
suggested by the FTC and Supreme Court, it is safe to assume that the members of a 
professional board that are market adversaries to the groups they are charged with 
regulating will act in their own self-interest.  Moreover, there are no statutory safeguards 
to protect the PBM industry when members of the Board of Pharmacy pursue policies 
benefitting pharmacists at the expense of the PBMs.  Mississippi has no program to 
actively supervise the Board of Pharmacy’s decisions; there is no Mississippi statute that 
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provides for direct judicial review of the Board of Pharmacy’s actions.119  Although the 
PBM industry can challenge decisions by the Board of Pharmacy in court, until a court 
rules, PBMs will suffer substantial financial losses and consumers and health plan 
sponsors will pay more for prescription drugs.     
Thus, under the amended Mississippi Pharmacy Practice Act, the Mississippi Board 
of Pharmacy has both the incentive and the opportunity to exert its regulatory authority in 
ways that benefit pharmacies at the expense of PBMs.  Even though the Board has only 
had regulatory authority over PBMs for a little over a year, two examples of regulations 
that harm PBMs have already emerged.   
1. Disclosure of Sensitive Business Information 
The first example of a regulation by the Mississippi Board of Pharmacy that 
competitively disadvantages PBMs while benefitting pharmacies is the Board’s ability to 
demand sensitive business information from PBMs.  This business information includes 
not only standard financial statements such as balance sheets and income statements, but 
also “any other information relating to the operations of the pharmacy benefit manager 
required by the board.”120  Although the Act specifies that PBMs will not be required to 
disclose proprietary information, it provides no guidance on what is considered 
proprietary.  Thus, the scope of protection for sensitive financial information is unclear. 
Moreover, the amended Act gives the Board the power to share PBMs’ financial 
information with pharmacists, the direct market rivals of PBMs: “The board may provide 
a copy of the financial examination to the person or entity who provides or operates the 
health insurance plan or to a pharmacist or pharmacy.”121 
Thus, the amended Act grants the Board of Pharmacy the power to require PBMs to 
turn over sensitive financial information, and then allows the Board to share that 
information with pharmacies.  This practice will benefit pharmacies by giving them 
business information about their market adversaries while weakening the PBM industry 
and producing significant harms for consumers and health plan sponsors.   
As an initial matter, if the Board requires PBMs to turn over additional financial 
information than was previously required, the collection, preparation, and presentation of 
the additional information will increase costs for the PBMs. 122  These costs will likely be 
passed on to health plans and consumers. 
More importantly, if the Board forces PBMs to turn over sensitive financial 
information, it will reduce PBMs’ bargaining power to negotiate discounts with 
pharmacies and rebates with drug manufacturers, thus increasing drug prices for 
consumers.   Both pharmacies and drug manufacturers are less likely to offer the same 
price terms to PBMs when they know their rival pharmacies or manufacturers can learn 
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the specifics of the arrangement.  When rivals can see the arrangement and offer the same 
or better terms, it blunts the incentive to offer PBMs favorable terms in the first place.123   
Moreover, pharmacies and manufacturers will be less likely to offer “deals” when they 
know that everyone they do business with can see the terms of the deal and will likely 
demand the same terms.124  Finally, uncertainty about rivals’ offerings induces 
pharmacies to offer greater discounts and manufacturers to offer greater rebates to try to 
outdo the “unknown” deals.125  But when the arrangements are no longer unknown, this 
incentive to outdo unknown price terms disappears.  Hence, disclosure of sensitive 
financial information will reduce the discounts and rebates that PBMs can pass on to 
consumers and health plan sponsors.  As a result, prescription drug spending will 
increase.   
Indeed, federal antitrust agencies have explained how sharing information among 
competitors can harm consumers; it “can blunt a firm’s incentive to offer customers 
better deals by undercutting the extent to which such a move would win business away 
from rivals” and “also can enhance a firm’s incentive to raise prices by assuaging the fear 
that such a move would lose customers to rivals.”126 
Thus, granting the Board the power both to require PBMs to disclose sensitive 
business information and to share that information with pharmacies will reduce 
competition in the market for prescription drugs.  Pharmacies and manufacturers will no 
longer compete as effectively for PBMs’ business when business arrangements are no 
longer private.  Moreover, PBMs will no longer be able to intensely compete for 
contracts with health plan sponsors by offering exclusive prices that they were able to 
negotiate with pharmacies and drug manufacturers.  
Finally, the increase in drug prices and reductions in competition could spill over to 
states beyond Mississippi.  PBMs’ business practices are likely similar across states so 
that disclosing information about PBMs’ practices in Mississippi will inform pharmacies 
and manufacturers about PBMs’ practices in other states.  They can use the information 
from Mississippi for their benefit in other states. For example, pharmacies and drug 
manufacturers in Alabama may demand the same pricing arrangements as PBMs 
negotiated in Mississippi.  Thus, disclosure of sensitive financial information in 
Mississippi could reduce competition across the industry and cause prescription drug 
prices to increase nationwide. 
2. Imposing a Fiduciary Duty on Pharmacy Benefit Managers 
The most recent example of the Mississippi Board of Pharmacy exploiting its 
regulatory authority to disadvantage PBMs is the imposition of a fiduciary duty on 
PBMs.  Adopted by the Board of Pharmacy on January 23, 2013, the new amendment to 
the Mississippi Pharmacy Practice Regulations states that PBMs “shall operate to the best 
interest of the patient or citizen of Mississippi, including costs related to the patient or 
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citizen.”127 A duty to act in the “best interest” has been interpreted by courts to be a 
fiduciary duty;128 thus, this new regulation gives PBMs a fiduciary duty to covered 
consumers.   As a fiduciary, a PBM would owe consumers a duty of loyalty by acting “on 
behalf of the principal and only for his benefit.”129  This fiduciary duty includes a “duty 
to give information” that is independent of any disclosure requirements contained in the 
statute or private contracts and a “duty to account for profits” that may require PBMs to 
share more of their profits with health plan clients.130 
Fiduciary duties generally exist in situations where contracts cannot easily solve 
potential conflicts of interest.  In these situations, the threat of litigation that accompanies 
a fiduciary duty can deter opportunistic behavior.131  However, the PBM marketplace is 
not one in which contracts generally fail to protect against opportunistic behavior.  Health 
plan sponsors can enter into any contract they choose, and because of the intense 
competition among PBMs for contracts with health plan sponsors, the sponsors have 
considerable leverage to obtain desired contract terms.132  As a result, the sponsors can 
require a limited fiduciary duty for PBMs or the disclosure of sensitive business 
information in the contract.  
Even though health plan sponsors could contract for a fiduciary duty for PBM 
partners, many would choose not to because of the established consequences of this 
heightened legal duty.  A fiduciary duty entails a broader set of legal obligations than 
those typically specified in PBM contracts.  With the new legal obligations come new 
litigation risks; PBMs could be liable in tort actions in addition to being subject to 
liability claims for breach of contract.133  These new litigation risks will increase certain 
legal, administrative, and operating costs for PBMs.  PBMs, in turn, will pass on these 
additional costs to health plan sponsors and consumers, increasing the cost of prescription 
drug coverage.   
First, the increase in the risk of litigation for fiduciaries will increase certain legal 
and administrative costs for PBMs.  The legal obligations accompanying a fiduciary duty 
present new uncertainties and complexities.  PBMs will either expand the efforts of their 
existing litigation departments or consult with outside counsel to help them understand 
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their new status and advise them on certain defensive business practices to adopt in order 
to avoid litigation.134   
Second, liability concerns may deter PBMs from engaging in certain cost-reducing 
practices.  For example, because fiduciaries cannot profit at the expense of their clients, 
PBMs may be concerned that owning a mail-order pharmacy and employing incentives to 
direct covered consumers to that pharmacy will be interpreted as profiting at the expense 
of their clients.135 Because mail-order pharmacies are able to offer lower priced 
prescription drugs,136 deterring PBMs from utilizing mail-order pharmacies will increase 
the prices that consumers and health plan sponsors pay for prescription drugs.   
PBMs may be hesitant to contract at all with certain health plan sponsors because of 
the increased litigation risk that accompanies their fiduciary duty in these relationships.  
For example, sponsors that wish to provide only a limited network of retail pharmacies or 
place fewer preferred drugs on their formularies may expose PBMs to claims for breach 
of duties of care and skill if these arrangements appear to depart from best industry 
practices.137  Similarly, health plan sponsors may allege a breach of fiduciary duty if 
PBMs negotiate rebates from manufacturers or discounts from retail pharmacies that are 
less favorable relative to the terms negotiated by other PBMs or by the same PBMs in 
contracts with other health plan sponsors.138   If PBMs agree to contract with health plan 
sponsors despite the fiduciary duty, they will only be willing to incur the increased 
litigation risk if they receive higher fees from health plan sponsors.  These fees will 
increase the cost of prescription drug coverage for consumers.      
Moreover, fiduciary status will impose additional reporting requirements on PBMs 
that would likely lead to the disclosure of sensitive business information.139  As 
previously discussed, such disclosure will undermine competition in the PBM industry 
and increase prescription drug prices for consumers and health plan sponsors.   It will 
also competitively disadvantage PBMs while benefitting pharmacies. 
Thus, imposing a fiduciary duty on PBMs will compel these companies to adopt 
certain defensive measures, curb various cost-saving practices, incur additional legal and 
administrative costs, and increase the reporting of sensitive business information.  As a 
result of these changes, the cost of prescription drug coverage administered by PBMs will 
increase.  Moreover, many of the possible consequences of a fiduciary duty, such as a 
reduction in the utilization of mail-order pharmacies or increased reporting of sensitive 
business information, will undermine PBMs’ competitive positions in the prescription 
drug market relative to retail pharmacies that do not have fiduciary status.  That the 
Board of Pharmacy would impose a fiduciary duty on PBMs when a heightened legal 
duty is unnecessary—health plan sponsors’ contracts can already safeguard against 
opportunistic behavior and even contractually impose a fiduciary duty on PBMs—
demonstrates that the Board is exploiting its regulatory authority to disadvantage PBMs 
while benefitting pharmacies.   
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Indeed, no state regulatory agency has ever independently enacted a rule imposing a 
fiduciary duty on PBMs. Over the past decade, there have been bills introduced in over 
thirty states that sought to impose a fiduciary standard on PBMs.140  However, 
legislatures in twenty nine of these states decided against imposing a fiduciary duty after 
considering the likely consequences. Maine, in 2003, is the only state that enacted such a 
law, but that law was subsequently repealed by the Maine legislature in 2011.141 The 
District of Columbia also enacted a fiduciary provision in a 2004 law. That law, after 
years of litigation, was unanimously overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals in 2010.142 
CONCLUSION 
PBMs save Americans billions of dollars each year by lowering both the prices that 
consumers pay for prescription drugs and the prices that health plans pay for drug 
coverage.  However, new regulatory developments in some states threaten to undercut 
competition in the PBM industry and disrupt the cost savings PBMs currently generate.  
The regulatory scheme that was adopted by Mississippi in 2011 and is currently under 
legislative consideration in three other states—Oregon, Oklahoma, and Hawaii—shifts 
regulatory control of PBMs from the neutral Insurance Commissions to the states’ Boards 
of Pharmacy.  The fundamental problem with this structure is that the Boards of 
Pharmacy are made up of pharmacists, the direct market adversaries of PBMs.  In several 
different areas of the prescription drug market, PBMs and pharmacists are in direct 
competition over profits.  Thus, granting Boards of Pharmacy regulatory control over 
PBMs creates an inherent conflict of interest by giving pharmacists regulatory control 
over their natural competitors in the marketplace.  Under this new regulatory scheme, the 
Board has both the incentive and the power to exercise its regulatory power in ways that 
weaken PBMs’ competitive positions and, in turn, benefit pharmacies.  The power to 
regulate a market adversary gives pharmacists unprecedented power and will severely 
undercut competition in the prescription drug market.  
Unfortunately, this new regulatory scheme does more than just undermine 
competition in the PBM industry, it will also increase the prices that consumers and third 
parties must pay for prescription drugs.  Total annual prescription drug spending in the 
U.S. is currently around $263 billion, but industry estimates suggest that this number 
would be at least $100 billion more if it were not for PBMs’ cost-saving practices.143  It 
would be reckless for states to enact or maintain regulatory schemes that threaten to undo 
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these cost savings and increase prescription drug prices in our current state of ever-
increasing healthcare costs. 
 
	  
